Red sun setting, p.27
Red Sun Setting, page 27
What if TF 58 had headed west on the 18th? Would Mitscher have been sticking his neck out for the Japanese cleaver? Doubtful, because of the tactics the Japanese actually used. At all times Ozawa wanted to keep TF 58 at arms’ length (his own arms—his planes’ range—having more reach than his enemy) and most likely would have retreated for a while to stay out of range. If Ozawa had retreated, then headed back east in two groups to try a flanking maneuver, he would have been crisscrossing an area of heavy American submarine activity, and might have lost more ships to these opportunistic hunters.
By heading west on the 18th, Mitscher might have just pushed Ozawa away from the Marianas and kept the Mobile Fleet from doing any damage at Saipan. In other words, a little aggressiveness on the part of the Americans would very likely have protected the Saipan beachhead just as easily, and more emphatically, than merely waiting for the first blow.
Finally, if TF 58 had headed west and closed the distance with the Mobile Fleet enough to launch a strike on the morning of the 19th, would the results have been less in TF 58’s favor? Morison seems to think so, believing that massed Japanese planes and antiaircraft fire would have exacted a much greater toll of U.S. planes. Also, some U.S. carriers could have been sunk by the enemy. Then, with TF 58 occupied with the enemy ships, the Guam-based planes would have had a field day.29
American aircraft losses probably would have been greater than the combat losses they actually suffered, but would they have exceeded the eighty-two planes lost “operationally” following the 20 June attack? This is extremely doubtful. Japanese antiaircraft gunnery was not so effective as it could have been at this stage of the war (radar-controlled gunnery was still in its infancy in the Japanese Navy); the amount of flak thrown up by a unit like C Force often looked more awesome than it was. And as has been mentioned repeatedly throughout this book, the caliber of most of the Japanese fliers made heavy losses of U.S. planes unlikely. Conversely, the quality of American radar-controlled gunnery and aircraft intercepts would have made enemy attacks on TF 58 quite dangerous, and almost suicidal. (This was actually the case in the 19 June raids.) The enemy might have been able to hit a few carriers, but it is highly unlikely they would have sunk any. The Essex-class carriers were very tough, as were the light carriers, and American damage control techniques had improved considerably since the early days of the war.
An attack on the Mobile Fleet on the 19th would have been much better organized than the attack that was actually made. Being better organized, it would have had a greater chance of inflicting heavier damage on the enemy. Sunk or damaged carriers would have been of little use to the pilots in the air, and a flight to Guam past TF 58 would not have been easy. And this brings us to another point by Morison—the Guam-based planes. How many of these were there? Only about fifty. Almost all of the Marianas-based planes had been destroyed during the preinvasion operations. Yap, Palau, and Truk shuttled in replacements that created some problems on the morning of the 19th, but these were soon beaten down. If they had been left alone on the 19th, these fifty planes might have irritated TF 58, but being of such a small number (just a little over half of what just one fast carrier had), they can not be considered a major threat. Much of the activity over Guam on 19 June was caused by planes from Ozawa’s force trying to reach the dubious safety of Orote field. Even these planes probably would not have reached Guam if Mitscher had attacked their ships that day.
“The greatest loss (to TF 58) was one of position,” Land and Van Wyen concluded, “which even during the battle had not been too desirable. The Task Force was caught between two forces, being to the lee of the enemy’s land bases and holding the enemy carrier force downwind. The necessity of heading into the wind for the rotation of fighters during the battle resulted in the relative position of the two carrier forces remaining about the same, both moving closer to the Japanese land bases as the battle progressed. At the end of the day the Japanese Fleet was still beyond the range of our carrier planes.”30
On the 17th Spruance had issued his battle plan, saying, “Our air will first knock out enemy carriers. . . . Action against the retreating enemy must be pushed vigorously by all hands to insure complete destruction of his fleet.” Aggressive sounding, but the next day he had already settled into a defensive posture. Instead of pressuring the Japanese, he was allowing himself to be pressured. It is hard to reconcile Spruance’s aggressive ardor of one day, and his defensive pallor of the next. It is interesting to note that in his battle plan he gave no thought to an enemy flanking maneuver, considering his concern for that possible tactic. It also appears that Spruance, still the surface sailor, did not comprehend the possibility that the Japanese would use to advantage the range of their planes, and attempt to destroy or damage the U.S. ships before closing for a purely surface action.31
To Spruance a “fleet action” still meant battleship against battleship. This conception was not that unusual; there were still many in the U.S. Navy who thought that way. But naval warfare was changing, and a fleet action could now mean either a surface or an aerial action.32 If Spruance had been more conversant with the aviation capability of his fleet perhaps he would have headed west for the “decisive” action.
Besides Spruance’s fateful decision not to head west, there was another factor that hindered the Americans during the battle. This was the relatively poor performance of American searchers. Not just the carrier planes, but the land- and sea-based patrol planes fell far short of what was required. Carrier search endeavors had fallen by the wayside as the war continued, and the other patrol planes had been unable to take up the slack. Still, in the Philippine Sea the PBMs may have had some excuse. “The PBMs were buffeted about considerably at their open sea moorings,” ComAirPac said later, “were attacked on the water by enemy planes, and on account of the rugged operating conditions, suffered radio and IFF failures which may have hindered their contact reporting as well as subjected them to attack by F6Fs and our own forces (which shot down two).33
The Battle of the Philippine Sea brought home hard the deficiencies of U.S. search techniques. Because of communications problems the PMB and PB4Y searches too often provided information to Spruance and Mitscher too late to be of use. Commenting on the initial contact report from Lieutenant Arle which was not received until eight hours later, ComAirPac said, “During this delay the Japs hit TF 58 first from a fleet of then unknown exact location. Their force, then out of round-trip range of ours, could possibly have been closed sufficiently to permit an early morning attack if the message had been received.”34
Also in the matter of searches, Mitscher and his carrier admirals seemed to be operating under the idea that the battle was just another tactical exercise. Except in the last stages of the fight, little effort was expended in extending the range beyond the normal distances the search planes always flew. Eventually, using Avengers with bomb-bay tanks or utilizing the Hellcat’s remarkable range, the distances were extended; but by that time it was too late. “Our carrier planes can reach the limits of their versatility, and inflict maximum damage on the enemy,” ComAirPac stated after the battle, “only if their capabilities are realized and exploited by flexible minds. In 1942 ‘more range’ was the cry of the entire carrier force; now that we possess the range, it should be used.”35 Task Force 58’s commanders also did not seem to attach great importance to the fact that enemy carrier planes had been seen (and shot down) at fairly great distances from TF 58. There appears to have been no attempt to follow up on these sightings by sending more long-range searches to these areas.
Following the battle, numerous recommendations based on various aspects of the fighting began their slow way up the chain of command. Among the many recommendations were several complaints about the relatively poor performance of the torpedo planes in the shipping attack role. These complaints soon led to the Avengers’ carrying of smaller bombs and a reversion back to their original weapon, the torpedo.36 The various problems that surfaced during Forager were eventually overcome as U.S. forces slugged their way to Japan.
Though there had been problems in various areas, there were also some bright spots. One such “star” was the activity of the U.S. submarines. Constantly harassing the Japanese at Tawi Tawi, then reporting their movements; providing lifeguard service for downed pilots in the Marianas; and finally, topping it off by sinking two enemy carriers—in all these, the submariners proved invaluable. Working the other side of the street from the submarines, but equally important, were the U.S. antisubmarine units. With the England leading the way, they decimated the Japanese undersea forces and prevented them from being of any use during the battle.
However, in the final analysis, it was the pilots of TF 58 that broke the back of the Japanese in the Philippine Sea. In the Turkey Shoot they completely controlled the sky, and only small remnants of the enemy escaped to fight again. Then on the 20th they attacked the Mobile Fleet and, though not doing as much damage as was hoped, reduced enemy airpower to an insignificant factor, and battered some Japanese ships.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea was a great, though frustrating victory for the Americans. However, had Spruance been more aggressive, it could have been decisive and the Battle of Leyte Gulf might never have taken place. That it could have ended the war in a few days, as Jocko Clark thought,37 is very unlikely considering the vast amount of territory Japan still controlled, the time period during which the battle was fought (mid-1944), and the state of Japanese civilian and military politics at that time.
Yet Operation Forager, in which the Battle of the Philippine Sea played such an important part, probably did help shorten the war. Repercussions in Japan over the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the occupation of Saipan were immediate. “Hell is on us,” remarked one anguished Japanese official following the fall of Saipan.38 Many knowledgeable Japanese agreed with this assessment of the situation. To these people, the war had become increasingly unfavorable to Japan, and Premier Hideki Tojo’s government had drawn more and more blame for the country’s predicament. The loss of Saipan further inflamed the situation. Tojo made an effort to compromise by offering some of his positions in the government to others, but was unable to get anyone to accept. On 18 July 1944 (the day the fall of Saipan was finally announced to the Japanese public) Tojo and his cabinet resigned. A new cabinet was formed under General Kuniaki Koiso. Koiso vowed to fight the Allies with all his power, but the fall of Saipan had allowed a peace party to slowly gain strength in the inner circles of the Japanese government.
In a militaristic government such as that in Japan during World War II, the peace movement had to be circumspect, for many of the military firebrands used assassination as a tool to eliminate opposition or dissent. But as the war continued to go against Japan, the peace movement grew and would eventually prevail. Thus Forager and the Battle of the Philippine Sea had played an enormously fateful role in the internal development of the Japanese government.39
What had the Battle of the Philippine Sea cost the combatants during the two days of action, the 19th and 20th? American losses were remarkably light for the ferocity of the fighting. On the 19th TF 58 lost three planes on search missions, one plane to an enemy fighter and seven to flak over Guam, fourteen to enemy planes on interception missions, and six operationally. With these thirty-one planes were lost twenty-seven pilots and crewmen. While the next day’s loss of aircraft tripled, the number of fliers lost did not quite double. Only six planes were shot down by flak, while eleven fell to the Zekes. Listed as operational losses were an incredible eighty-two planes; many of these planes had run out of gas or made water landings. But with superlative search and rescue work by TF 58 and the Saipan-based PBMs, only sixteen pilots and thirty-three crewmen were lost.40
One high-ranking officer in TF 58 might be considered an indirect loss. On 29 June Rear Admiral “Keen” Harrill was felled with acute appendicitis and had to undergo surgery. He never returned to a command in the fast carriers. Although his operation provided a convenient excuse to ease him out of the carriers, the real reason was Harrill’s less-than-acceptable handling of his task group throughout the battle and—unforgivable to some fire eaters—his apparent non-aggressiveness.
While American losses were relatively light, Japanese losses were overwhelming. When dawn broke on 19 June Ozawa had 430 carrier planes and 43 floatplanes available. During the day he launched 355 carrier planes and 19 floatplanes. Only 130 of these returned to the Mobile Fleet! Twenty-two planes had also been lost when the Taiho and Shokaku went down. Some of the planes that did not return to the Mobile Fleet made it to Guam and Rota, where most were wrecked upon landing or were too damaged for further use. The next morning Ozawa could report only 100 carrier planes and 27 floatplanes operational. Many of the planes that had made it back to their ships were too shot up to use on the 20th. On 19 June the Japanese had lost about 300 fighters and bombers and 16 float planes!
Following the action on the 20th, Ozawa could report only 25 Zekes and 10 other carrier planes, plus 12 floatplanes, in operational condition. According to the Japanese, Ozawa lost only 19 carrier planes in combat on the 20th, but an amazing 46 carrier planes and 15 floatplanes operationally. It seems incredible that 61 Japanese planes could have been lost “operationally” during combat over their own fleet; Morison estimates that about 40 planes were shot down by the Americans.
No matter what the cause of the losses, Japanese naval airpower had suffered a blow from which it would never recover. On 19 and 20 June the Mobile Fleet lost 426 aircraft, plus about 50 more from Kakuta’s land-based units. With these 476 planes went approximately 450 aviators. It was a terrible loss. When the Japanese sortied again in October to fight at Leyte Gulf, the carriers would be used only as decoys, for there were few planes or aviators to man them.41
When the sun went down in the Philippine Sea on 20 June it did not mark just the passing of another day. It also prefigured the end of Japanese aspirations in the Pacific. The two-day Battle of the Philippine Sea had shorn the Japanese Navy of its most potent weapon—its airpower. Now there would be no more great victories; only the slow, inexorable slide into the darkness of defeat. Japan’s red sun was setting.
Appendix I
United States Units Engaged in the Battle of the Philippine Sea
(NOTE: This listing includes only those units actively participating in the battle, either through combat or in the search role. Although TF 58’s composition changed several times following the sortie on 6 June 1944, this listing shows TF 58’s organization for 19 and 20 June 1944. Asterisk (*) indicates killed in battle.)
Fifth Fleet
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance in Indianapolis
Task Force 58
(Fast Carrier Task Force)
Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher in Lexington
TASK GROUP 58.1
(Carrier Task Group One)
Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark (ComCarDiv 13) in Hornet
TASK GROUP 58.2
(Carrier Task Group Two)
Rear Admiral Alfred E. Montgomery (ComCarDiv 3) in Bunker Hill
TASK GROUP 58.3
(Carrier Task Group Three)
Rear Admiral John W. Reeves, Jr., (ComCarDiv 4) in Enterprise
TASK GROUP 58.4
(Carrier Task Group Four)
Rear Admiral William K. Harrill (ComCarDiv 1) in Essex
TASK GROUP 58.7
(Battle Line)
Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee Jr., (ComBatPac) in Washington
† There has been some confusion over the identities of DesDivs 4 and 24. Actually, the two units traded designations on 20 June 1944. DesDiv 24 stayed in the Southwest Pacific and was not in the battle.
Appendix II
Japanese Units Engaged in Operation A-GO, 1-20 June 1944
(Asterisk indicates man killed or ship sunk in battle.)
Mobile Fleet
Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa in Taiho
“A” FORCE
Vice Admiral Ozawa
(NOTE: Information on Japanese air strength is based on figures given in Campaigns of the Pacific War and represents assigned strength. Operational strength was actually much less. Morison estimates the actual strength in the Marianas-Palaus-Philippines-Bonins area in early June as only 540 aircraft.)
Appendix III
U.S. Air Operations on 19 June
I -Interceptions
(NOTE: Charts based on those in “Naval Air Operations in the Marianas” and squadron ACA reports.)
II-Bombing Missions
III-Search and Rescue Missions
Appendix IV
U.S. Air Operations on 20 June: The Attack on the Mobile Fleet
Notes
Chapter 1
1.Lt. Grace P. Hayes, “The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: The War Against Japan” (hereafter cited as Hayes) Vol. I, pp 142, 194; Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (hereafter cited as Matloff), p 186; Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (hereafter cited as Morton), p 33.
2.Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, “The Army Air Forces in World War II” Vol. IV The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, p XIV; John Miller, Jr., Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, p 1.
3.Hayes, Vol. I, p 142.
4.Major Carl W. Hoffman, Saipan: The Beginning of the End (hereafter cited as Hoffman), p 14.
5.Hayes, Vol. I, p 388.
6.Ibid; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. VIII, New Guinea and the Marianas (hereafter cited as Morison), p 5.
